I. Scene

In his dialogue called the Republic, Plato, through the mouthpiece of his fictionalized master, Socrates, lays out a blueprint for a bloated, luxurious yet just city-state called ‘Kalliapolis’. In conceptualizing the structure of this just city-state – that is to say, its division of labour and its distribution into three classes – Plato is sets up a relationship between the philosopher (and her avatars, the philosopher-king and the guardians) and what is thinkable in the field of politics. However, in building this relationship between philosophy and politics, it seems that Plato cannot avoid mediating it through a third term: a character, a rival, a danger to be excluded from the just city – the imitator (Bk10, 597c). The imitator is explicitly identified as the playwright and actor: someone who “wants to perform his poems in person” (Bk3, 398a). A few pages earlier Plato distinguishes three different modes of storytelling, narrative (in epic poems), imitation (in tragedy and comedy), and a mix of imitation and narrative (dithyrambic poems). Tragedy and comedy, making up theatre, are identified as pure imitation. Plato’s infamous ban on theatre, his expulsion of plays from his hypothetical just city, takes a particularly ritualistic turn: when the travelling player turns up at the gates of the city Plato writes: “If he came to our city wanting to perform his poems in person...We would pour myrhh over his head, garland him with woollen garlands, and send him on his way to another city” (Bk3, 398a). What is this if not the ancient rite of sacrificing the scapegoat – itself singled out by some specialists as the putative origin of tragedy,
one etymology of which is ‘goat song’? The philosopher-king theatrically excludes ‘theatricality’ from his just city.

Hence instead of a dual relationship between philosophy and politics, Plato’s Republic inaugurates a triangle within which we are still confined: the philosopher, the action of politics, and the risk of the imitator. The imitator as playwright is positioned as a rival to the philosopher in that she arrogates the role educating the guardians, the future governors of the city. The imitator threatens to corrupt the guardians by turning them into ‘imitators of everything’ rather than sticking to their function.

In Plato’s Gorgias and the Sophist the imitator is identified as not only the actor or playwright but also as the sophist, an actual historical rival of the philosopher in Athens in the business of education. In the Sophist Plato, without any detailed argument, identifies the sophist as an imitator. In the Gorgias, Socrates tries to pin down Gorgias in his distribution of proper arts (techne) within the city. Gorgias retorts that rhetoric is the art of arts, securing success via persuasion in all of the arts. Socrates claims that the sophist peddles false knowledge since the sophist professes to know everything and yet it is impossible for anyone to know everything: here we rejoin the imitator as ‘jack of all trades’ in the Republic. The sophist is shown to proffer spoken-images rather than ideas. In Book 10 of The Republic, Plato revisits and reiterates his argument for the expulsion of the poets and tragedians from the ideal city. This time he makes use of an ontological argument, distributing three levels of being according to their degree of stability, self-identity over time, and hence knowability: the Ideas, the sensible copies of those ideas, and simulacra or images, degraded copies of those copies. Both the tragedian and the sophist are impostors because they sell simulacra, false images of wisdom, simulacra – or spoken-images – whose being is unstable; that is to say, whose self-identity over time is highly vulnerable (Bk 10, 598c-d).

Plato’s inaugural triangle hence comes in three different variations. In Book 4 of the Republic it is articulated as philosophy-politics-theatre. In the Gorgias and the Sophist, it is articulated as philosopher-politics-sophist. In Book 10 of the Republic Plato has recourse to ontology to develop a version of this triangle that classifies sophistics and theatre under the catch-all term of imitation, or unstable simulacra, spoken-images: philosophy-theatre-simulacra. Through this ontological argument, the fate of sophistics and theatre are bound together within the articulation of philosophy and politics.

Barbara Cassin’s Project

As outlined in L’effet sophistique, Cassin’s project is not merely to rehabilitate the sophists from their dismissal and disqualification at the hands of Plato and Aristotle. Nor does she set out to recuperate them for some modern philosophical viewpoint as liberals, democrats, pluralists or pragmatists avant la lettre (ES, 23-
Her project is to unleash the sophist’s discourse beyond its philosophical fabrication and misconstrual. She does this not only through painstaking critique and undoing of the very arguments used by Plato and Aristotle to exclude the sophists, but more powerfully through close readings of the sophist’s own texts, however fragmentary, and of the doxographic mentions and caricatures of their work. Hence she seeks to capture sophistry’s own agency in its two classic periods: the first Greek sophistic, and the second Roman sophistic. That agency takes form through sophistics’ shaping of philosophy’s projects; sophistics’ diagnosis of philosophy’s historical self-misunderstanding; and sophistics’ categorization and dismissal of philosophy in turn.

In the introduction to one of her earliest and longest works, *L’effet sophistique*, Cassin explains her project in the following way:

To attempt to understand sophistry, at the very least, beyond the oppositions between philosophy and rhetoric, sense and nonsense, one must accept its discursive performances as shrewd positions taken against ontology: sophistry as evading metaphysics and as alternative to the classic line of philosophy. (ES, 12)

In short, Cassin diagnoses the existence of a double ‘sophistic effect’. That is, what has historically been understood as sophistry, is nothing but an ‘effect’ of philosophy’s own discursive performances; however, and here’s the twist, this artefact, this ‘alter-ego’ of philosophy turns out to have its productive effect on philosophy, and on its limits: indeed Cassin goes so far as to entitle a chapter “ontology as a sophistic masterwork”.

Cassin makes wide-sweeping claims about the history of philosophy, drawing a quick line between Aristotle’s exclusion of sophistics in Book Gamma of the *Metaphysics* and Habermas and Apel’s delimitation of the transcendental rules of language games. She explicitly assumes this project in the following terms: “to rewrite the history of philosophy under the influence of sophistry”, and qualifies it by stating sophistics’ “history of delimiting philosophy has as its epicenter the problem of the regulation of language” (ES, 16). At times the grand ambition of this project is expressed in hyperbole:

Gorgias’ critique of Parmenides can only be adequately grasped, in my eyes, from the standpoint of logic or discursivity. Such an approach does not fall into non-philosophy, far from it. On the contrary, I believe that this will confront us with such a position so strong with regard to ontology or metaphysics in general, that it could well turn out to be philosophically uncircumventable. (ES, 26)

To attain an ‘uncircumventable position’ for Gorgias: what could be more philosophical than such a claim’s argumentative ambition? Is this not precisely philosophy as the discourse of the master in Lacan’s terms? Is this not just one more recuperation of sophistry on the part philosophy? The answer to these three
objections is no. The very concept of recuperation, indeed the whole dialectic of self and other, of misrecognition, projection, and introjection, of master and hysteric is too simplistic for what plays out between sophistry and philosophy as seen through Cassin’s work.

In a gesture reminiscent of Derrida’s coinage of ‘grammatology’ or ‘deconstruction’, Cassin baptizes her own discourse, ‘logology’. She writes:

I propose to name this perception of ontology as a discourse, this insistence on the autonomous performativity of language and on the world-effect it produces, logology, from a term borrowed from Novalis. (ES, 13)

Such is Cassin’s project in outline. Let us stage an encounter between this project and Plato’s inaugural triangulation of philosophy, politics and simulacra.

The Hypothesis

If, in Plato’s triangle, there is an original amalgamation of the tragedian and the sophist – two of philosophy’s greatest rivals – under the heading of ‘simulacra’, any massive rearticulation of the nature of sophistics, and hence of the relationship between the philosopher and the sophist, will also have consequences for how philosophy understands theatricality. My working hypothesis is that a new comprehension of the sophistics entails a new comprehension of theatricality.

Two methodological challenges immediately raise their ugly heads. First, logically speaking, it does not follow that Cassin’s unleashing of the sophists entails a different thinking of theatre. It could be the case that Plato got the sophists wrong, but at the same time got theatre right: the sophists do not proffer simulacra, but tragedians do, and the place of theatricality in relation to politics does not need to be rethought. Or, it could be the case that both sophistics and theatre have a constitutive relationship to what we call ‘politics’, but the rethinking of sophistics and its relation to politics has no implications for the contemporary rethinking of theatre and its relation to politics, however the latter might take place. In short, there does not have to be any symmetry between sophistry and theatre’s relationships to the philosophy-politics couple.

The second objection is that Cassin does not take theatre and theatricality as a direct object in her work. There are many references to Sophocles and a close reading of Euripides’ play on Helen of Troy/Sparta in L’effet sophistique (ES, 84–98), but these references and this reading are offered as corroborations of themes treated by the sophists. Theatre per se, theatricality, tragedy, comedy, particular playwrights – evidently none of these form Cassin’s object. Nor does Cassin mention theatre itself as an object for the sophists.

Faced with these objections a wily researcher, calculating the cost-benefit ratio of pages read to working hours spent writing a citation-producing high-impact
journal article, would cut his losses and run, run far away. But this coyote is not so wily, and like a coyote with a bone, I couldn’t give up, or like a coyote hunting, there was a trail of traces to follow. In Cassin’s unleashing of the sophists beyond philosophy’s misconstrual of their action, she again and again employs theatrical motifs, to the point that it is tempting to speculate that there is no avoiding a passage via theatricality in any reconfiguration of the relationship between the sophist and the philosopher.

What then are these repeated theatrical motifs? The first is her continual recourse to Freud’s term of ‘primal scene’ when she restages the combats between philosophers and the sophists, whether it is that between Gorgias and Parmenides, Aristotle and unnamed sophist adversaries, or Gorgias and all detractors of Helen.

The second theatrical motif – after Aristotle via Arendt, Austin and Desmond Tutu on the performative as generative of consensus – is that of the polis, the city-state, as a grand theatre. Cassin’s investigation of the effects of a certain kind of speech within and on the polis cannot be disentangled from Aristotle’s positioning of tragedy in the Poetics as a cathartic experience that rearticulated the affective orientation of the people. The third theatrical motif – and as we progress in our investigation we will find how just how labile any typology becomes in Cassin’s work – is that of words as bodies, words that do things, sometimes unpredictable things, precisely because they are material bodies, sounds that come out of certain people’s mouths and land in certain people’s ears, before they are interpreted.

The enquiry into theatricality via these primal scenes, the performative, and via words as material bodies leads to a series of speculative theses on the nature of theatricality. These theses concern conflict, the ‘who?’ as an open question, depth, voiced words, and the suspense of the moment. Since these theses emerge from an investigation of a contemporary re-positioning of the sophists, they might find a contemporary resonance in the worlds of theatre and performance, and they might make a difference to not only how we comprehend and classify theatre, but also how we direct and design it. Whether this is the case, however, is a matter for another enquiry, running them through encounters with contemporary theatre.

II. Restaging the Primal Scenes

Cassin restages three primal scenes in which the sophist combats the philosopher: The first pits Parmenides’ Poem, and his ‘crisis’, against Gorgias’ parody of that poem in his Treatise of non-being. The second – which Cassin herself names ‘la scène originaire – is Aristotle’s decision of meaning in Book Gamma of the Metaphysics in which he confronts and dismisses those who would refuse the principle of contradiction (AL,12). The third primal scene occurs through Cassin’s reading of Gorgias “Praise of Helen”.
a. Parmenides poem versus Gorgias’ Treatise of non-being (ES, 23-65)

Parmenides’ poem ventriloquizes a goddess who sets up a *krisis*, that is to say, a foundational choice for the listener, or reader, between two ‘ways’, two orientations of thought, the first that of being, persuasion and truth, and the second that of non-being. The goddess declares that the second way is impracticable, deceptive, unknowable. The poem. Subsequently sets out three theses that inaugurate the entire tradition of ontology: there is being because being is, and non-being is not; being is essentially knowable, because being and thinking are one and the same; and that knowledge is transmissible (ES, 27-8).

Gorgias’ treatise is entitled "On non-being or on nature". It sets out three theses: "nothing is"; "if it is, it is unknowable"; and, "if it is, and it is knowable, it cannot be communicated to others" (ES, 27-8). Not only are these declarations directly antithetical to those of the poem, but they are linked together by what Freud called ‘kettle logic’ (ES, 27). Cassin shows how Gorgias’ demonstrates that what Parmenides calls ‘being’ is a reification of the verb ‘to be’, at the same time as the result of the assignation of a subject – ‘there is’, ‘*il y a*’, ‘*il est être*’ – to the abstract verb ‘to be’. In short, Gorgias shows that ontology depends on a syntactical trick, and is thus a form of sophistics (ES, 28,43). In short, and this is a thesis Cassin takes from Gorgias and repeats throughout her work “being is an effect of saying” (ES, 40).

So in Gorgias and then Cassin’s hands, what we have is a clash between two discursive performances – the poem and the treatise on non-being – which is at the same time a clash between two voices – Parmenides and Gorgias. There is no simple reconciliation between these discourses. One of them not only chooses and follows a path forbidden by the other, but also goes so far as to refuse the very framework of an either/or choice between these two ways. Cassin claims at one point that Gorgias’ *Treatise* is a parody of the poem. To go even further, if in Plato’s the *Sophist* the protagonist the ‘Stranger’ confesses that in critiquing Parmenides he is committing parricide, then Gorgias is also committing parricide, since his very discourse would not exist if it were not for Parmenides’ original generative discourse.

In this encounter two, three or four actions occur: the declaration of an unavoidable choice, the prohibition of one route and guidance towards the other; the refusal of the choice or the rebellious decision to take the ‘wrong route’ and the denunciation of the sleight of hand employed in setting up this so-called choice. Two different voices affront each other in an asymmetrical encounter. Consequences are expected of these choices – whose warning, whose orientation will turn out to be practicable? Actions, an encounter of voices, expectation of consequences: this is a scene. It is a primal scene because it occurs around one of the primordial texts in the Mediterranean philosophical tradition and because the scene is repeated – knowingly or unknowingly – throughout that entire tradition up till and through today.
There is one evident theatrical motif to be retained from Cassin’s restaging of this scene, and it is that of conflict, irresolvable conflict, ‘meta-conflict’ over the very stakes of the conflict, over the very names of the sides involved in the conflict: the way of being vs the way of non-being, or sophist-logologist vs philosopher-sophist-in-denial? On this basis one can extrapolate a thesis on theatricality, a thesis that names one of the necessary but not sufficient conditions of theatricality:

**THESIS 1**: Theatricality is a configuration of appearance that occurs when there is a conflict-vortex.

A conflict-vortex is an all-swallowing fight or combat with the following characteristics:

- The number of sides or forces involved cannot be reduced to a dualism such as ‘good’ versus ‘evil’ because either there are clearly more than two sides combatting each other, and/or the very identity of the sides or forces is not stable or consistent (for instance, through the undoing and resoldering of alliances).

- Second, the conflict cannot be circumvented in that no-one has the power to remain in a neutral position or avoid taking a side (think of Tiresias who, despite his efforts, is turned into Oedipus’ enemy just by interpreting a prophecy).

- Third, the conflict is unending in that it is not subtended, for any of the combatants, by a goal or an end that could determine a strategy which might succeed or fail within a specific timeframe. There is no sovereign discourse, no ethics nor political science which could assign an unequivocal value or objective of peace which could be employed to bring a recognizable end to the conflict. Consequently, for each side, the conflict is fought out via tactics without strategy.

This idea of a conflict-vortex is developed in different manners in the two other primal scenes, but it also occurs in Cassin’s reading of Antiphon’s *Tetralogies* and his text *On the Truth* which concerns the law and its relation to natural processes of vengeance.

In *On the Truth* the law never possesses the value of an endpoint. On the contrary, it is never anything other than one more process, following the natural economy, itself unstoppable. The law, or more precisely what is ‘just according to the law’ is incapable of ‘providing assistance’ to those who respect it. First of all it intervenes too late: the act has been accomplished, suffering has occurred, the damage is irreparable…Then, at the moment in which it actually intervenes via punishment, the appropriateness of its intervention is not guaranteed in any manner. Indeed, it is exclusively an effect of persuasion. (ES, 184-5)
In other words, no legal procedure or just trial could ever occur which would put an end to the conflict between the perpetrator and victim. Indeed in Antiphon’s texts, those very terms – perpetrator and victim – turn out to be interchangeable. The domain of the law, of institutions, of conventions and procedures, turns out to be relatively impotent when it comes to constraining, preventing, channelling or reducing the domain of nature, of the passions, of the appetites and of vengeance. Even if the legal institutions do their work and bring their procedures to their proper end, those procedures are recovered and reinterpreted in natural terms, in the terms of desire, interest, appetite and vengeance. In this manner, in Antiphon’s text, there is no legal end to conflict, but rather cycles of natural violence under one name or another. Through Cassin’s interpretation, these natural cycles may be linked, quite elliptically to practices of ‘returning to the sender’ that occur in a primary school playground: ‘Stupid!’ – ‘I know you are but what am I?’. Another playground confusion of use and mention instituting a bad infinity of auto-citational annoyance is the wonderful French refrain ‘Je connais une chanson qui enerve les gens: Je connais une chanson qui enerve les gens: ‘...’.”

b. Aristotle’s decision of sense (ES, 55-58)

At the beginning of chapter 4 of Book Gamma of the Metaphysics, Aristotle undertakes a demonstration of the principle of contradiction. Since he stipulates that it is a first principle of this new ‘first philosophy’ or discourse on being that he is developing, it cannot be demonstrated: indeed, it is required for any demonstration to work (AL,12). However, what he can do is dialectically refute those adversaries who pretend to refuse this principle or not to admit it. These adversaries would hence to be those who maintain that the same thing can both be and not be. The condition of success of Aristotle’s refutation, however, depends not on Aristotle, but on the adversaries: they must start the game, they must simply ‘say something’ (1006a12). So here we have a trap laid by the philosopher, a trap for a very strange kind of interlocutor – at least in the philosopher’s eyes – one who affirms that the same thing is and is not. If the interlocutor refuses to fall into this trap – that is, in the philosopher’s eyes, by ‘saying nothing’ – then s/he is strange to the point of no longer qualifying as human, and being ‘similar to a plant’. I cite Aristotle:

If he doesn’t say anything, it is absurd to try to respond to someone who speaks of nothing, given that in such a manner he is not making any statements; for such man, inasmuch as he is a man, is similar to a plant. (1006a12-15)

But just how strange is such an interlocutor? Take phenomena or events that, in discussion between two interlocutors, turn out to be equivocal or ambiguous or difficult to categorize. Within the discussion those phenomena or events, due to their ambivalence, at the same time both are and are not whatever predicates or properties one might want to assign to them. Anybody who has been in love for a long time has learnt to negotiate this kind of contradiction at all levels of
the relationship. Things both being and not-being something is actually quite an ordinary experience. So, in return, just how strange is that character, the philosopher, who insists that someone who not only refuses the principle of contradiction but also refuses his trap, is similar to a plant?

It is a trap to agree to simply 'say something' because Aristotle has already set up a series of equivalences: to speak is always to say something; to say something is to mean something; and, to mean something is to signify something unique and identical for oneself and for another (ES, 56). Aristotle says it is impossible to directly demonstrate the principle of contradiction. One reason for this is that all demonstrations presuppose the principle of contradiction, so such an approach would beg the question. However, in this dialectical refutation of the sophist, Aristotle's series of equivalences, that is, his interpretation of the action of speaking, of saying, explicitly uses the principle of contradiction: to mean something is to signify something unique and the same for oneself and for another, that is to say, with no ambiguities. This is how the trap works: as soon as the interlocutor says something, in Aristotle's eyes she or he has already admitted the principle of contradiction because of the very nature of saying something. But is no other interpretation possible of the action of speaking? Cassin suggests that the sophists, their avatars and her discourse of logology open up just such an alternative interpretation of speech. If such an understanding does exist, and it is coherent, then who are these brave interlocutors who refuse Aristotle's trap? Who are these people who speak and say, without saying just one thing, or meaning just one thing which would be the same for you and me? Who are these people who speak in homonymies?

Aristotle's dialectical refutation holds open the possibility that the interlocutor refuses the first step of the refutation, and therefore 'says nothing' – if so, he equates them with plants. This is a negative gesture that outlines another place, a place in which people do speak and say because otherwise they could not even refuse the principle of contradiction. Yet these people speak in a manner that is very difficult to recognize for Aristotle, to the point that they can no longer be qualified as humans. Cassin's text carries out a positive gesture, outlining the coherency and stability of this other place. Hence when Cassin restages this primal scene what she creates is depth: this is the motif to be retained. Depth in that one of the speaking characters, one of the parties in this encounter, or missed encounter, comes from somewhere a long way away, somewhere quite different, somewhere with its own history, somewhere yet to be explored and understood.

Cassin has her own term for a negative gesture which outlines another place: to barbarize. She draws this term from the sophist Antiphon of Rhamnunte, and it means to relegate the other to the condition of being less than human, a barbarian, lacking either in the correct nature (the ethnocentrism or racism at stake in Pericles' Funeral Speech of Pericles, Plato's Menexene) or lacking access to the polis (Isocrates). To barbarize is to not recognize the other as belonging to a polis, or to misrecognize the other as not belonging to a polis, at the same time as asserting
one’s own proper belonging to a polis. If there is a corresponding positive gesture on the part of the other outlining this alternative space from which they speak, then we have an appearance of depth.

The motif of depth allows us to add to the thesis on theatricality as involving a conflict-vortex. The fourth characteristic of such a vortex is that the conflict is unstoppable in that no middle ground can be found between voices or characters from different depths; that is to say, characters who appear as originating, as coming from, entirely different hinterlands. Given a plurality of characters in a conflict-vortex, these are the depths that render impossible philosophy’s task faced with the polis – at least since Plato according to Rancière – and that is the task of constructing a stable distribution of roles, of social classes or types, and of goods, within one homogeneous space.

c. Gorgias’ Praise of Helen (ES, 66-98)

The third primal scene occurs not so much in Cassin’s text, between philosopher and sophist, or philosopher and ‘plant’, but in one of Gorgias’ famous texts Encomium of Helen. This scene occurs between Gorgias and the detractors and admirers of Helen, and it is pragmatically addressed to us, readers and listeners: are we in turn admirers or detractors of Helen? Would we have embarked on one of those thousand ships? Even worse, is there one true Helen behind all the portraits of her, one that, once she is finally found, or won, would validate or disappoint our decision?

Already in Homer’s Odyssey, with a supposedly dutiful Helen returned to Menelaus, whom Telemachus is visiting to ask of news of his long-absent father, Helen’s nature is ambiguous. She pours a drug into their wine to “quiet all pain and strife” before they reminisce and recall her own ambiguous deeds during the Trojan war: she tells of how she alone guessed Odysseus’ identity when he snuck into Troy disguised as a beggar – and he told her of the Greek plans – yet she kept that secret from her hosts, the Trojans, because “already my heart was turned to go back to my home”, regretting bitterly that a Phrodite had blinded her when she chose to flee with Paris (IV, 261). Then Menelaus answers her with another story – and remark what an astonishingly forgiving or rather drugged husband he must be – when he grants that Helen must have been “bidden by some God”, when she went around the Trojan horse three times calling out the names of the Greek soldiers inside, whilst ventriloquizing the voice of their wives, tempting them to reveal themselves. But for the steadfastness and determination of Odysseus at least two of them would have leapt out of the horse in broad daylight. Helen is thus ambiguous in Homer’s portrait in that she betrays both sides as Cassin remarks (ES, 77). She is a kind of double agent.

In Gorgias’ Encomium of Helen he sets out three possible interpretations of her action. She left Menelaus either by the intentions of destiny, the will of the Gods and the decrees of necessity; or because she was forcibly abducted, or because she
was persuaded by speech (§6, ES, 143). Later he adds a fourth hypothesis, she did it all out of love (§15). Gorgias then shows for each of these hypotheses, for each of these accusations, she is innocent, even that of love, in which he argues she was the victim of her own eyes (§19, ES, 147-8).

In Cassin’s reading, which she bolsters with references to many other ancient texts that take up the question of Helen, it is not just a question of which of these hypotheses is true, or of whether Helen is guilty or innocent. Cassin shows that in the myth of Helen and her duplicity, there is not one argument that is not duplicated by its contrary (ES, 76). Indeed she goes so far as to claim that Gorgias shows that Helen’s innocence is her guilt. In the end the Encomium of Helen “practices sophistic discursivity” in that “Helen is what is said of her”, Helen is “Helen”, an effect of saying (ES, 75). In the closest and longest reading of a play I have found in Cassin’s œuvre, that of Euripides’ play Helen, she shows at length how Helen is an effect of having been called ‘Helen’. In a burst of theatrical enthusiasm Cassin lists all the different versions of Helen that “I would like to, at least on paper, stage … amplifying the philosophical vector, then amplifying the sophistic vector”. But how does Encomium of Helen stage a primal scene?

Cassin cites an imperative from Goethe’s Faust, “See Helen in every woman” (verse 2603-4), and she shows that what is at stake in Helen is the question around which Freud’s theoretical machinery stalled at the end of his career, and the entirety of Lacan’s famous seminar Encore is organized: what does a woman want? Or how can a woman’s desire be discerned amongst a net of competing male desires? Gorgias’ Encomium presents a primal scene by opening up an interminable question.

This is what leads us to another theatrical motif, the basis for another thesis on theatricality: the ‘who’ as open question. In Gorgias’ text Helen’s identity is opened up as an enigmatic question or enquiry that goes beyond any designation of what social roles Helen may adopt. This is a question that cannot be answered by a social role or a type of personality, nor even by a simple listing of all the actions that the character supposedly carried out. Gorgias forces the admirers and the detractors of Helen onto a neverending road, asking themselves without respite, faced with all the episodes and tales and perspectives and actions attached to her name, repeating to themselves the unanswerable refrain: ‘Who is Helen?’

What are the stakes of this theatrical motif of ‘who’ as an open question? Through careful philological and conceptual analysis, Cassin shows again and again that each of philosophy’s apparently decisive victories over the sophists – in Plato’s Theatetus, the Sophist, the Gorgias, Protagoras and the Sophist, in Aristotle’s Metaphysics and his Sophistical Refutations – that each of them was a false victory, involving fallacies or sleights of hand, or misconstruals of the sophistic position. Cassin also identifies avatar after avatar of these misconstruals, not only in the scholarly commentary around the sophistic texts, but also in Heidegger and Habermas. But then if what is at stake is a philosophical project or task – for Cassin is without a doubt also a philosopher – of simply undoing this misconstrual then
what we are involved in is none other than a comedy of misrecognition, a little like *Twelfth Night*. But then how could a philosopher even hear a sophist’s claim ‘this has all been a misunderstanding’? In other words, how could this comedy end? The obstacles to a happy unveiling seem insurmountable. Philosophy conceives the sophist precisely as the one who wears a mask, who hides bad intentions behind that mask. What better mask to hide behind than the claim ‘this has all been a case of misrecognition?’ In trying to escape philosophy’s misconstrual of the sophist, is it thus even the right question to ask ‘who lies behind the mask?’ Perhaps we could respond that we do still possess direct access to the sophists’ writings so we know who they are, beyond the caricatures of philosophy, in that we know what they have to say. But if Gorgias himself says ‘Helen’ is an effect of saying in his encomium for Helen, and if Barbara Cassin has most definitely written an encomium for the sophists in *L’effet sophistique*, who is to say that her Gorgias is not also an effect of her saying? Moreover, in any case, who is Gorgias to praise Helen? He ends his *Encomium* by saying “I wanted to write the discourse that was praise of Helen, and for me, a toy” (ES, 148). But who toys with praise and blame given the grave consequences of those actions that meet with praise and blame precisely because they tear society apart or draw it together?

These questions on the ‘who’ help us launch another thesis on theatricality as a configuration of appearance:

*THESIS 2: Theatricality occurs when the ‘who’ is opened up as a question with un-plumbed depths.*

A question with unplumbed depths is a question that has no accessible answers, moreover, any answers that have been given to this question have been shown to be wrong, any answers that fill in the question of who with ‘what’, with what social role the character is supposed to play – wife, mother, lover, patriot – are shown to be inadequate. It is not only that there is no face behind the mask but another mask, but rather that the very identity of each of the masks is incomplete and indeterminate.

Let us now move to the second broad theatrical motif in Cassin’s work, and that is her interest in the performative dimension of language, not only in John Austin’s work, which meets with an extended commentary on her part only quite recently, but also in the role of language in Aristotle and Arendt’s conception of the *polis*, and Desmond Tutu’s discourse on the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in post-apartheid South Africa.

**III. The Political Body as Performance**

In *L’effet sophistique*, Cassin entitles the first section of her third chapter on politics: “The city-state as performance”, sourcing this idea in Gorgias’ speech on Olympus.
Perhaps it could be rephrased in verbal form – ‘the city-state is performed’ – but this would weaken the reference to John Austin’s concept of the performative, and it would also render Gorgias’ idea indistinguishable from Aristotle’s concept of the city-state as collective action. Cassin explains Gorgias’ idea in the following terms: *homonôia* (consensus, an accord of minds, not identity but the formal unity of a plurality) is produced or achieved through the use of *logos* (discourse, speech) by the internalization or integration of *stasis* (faction, conflict) (ES, 237-9). This sounds quite similar to the effect of a tragedy upon an audience’s passions according to Aristotle’s analysis of catharsis. Indeed, it leads Cassin, through a comparison between Aristotle and Plato’s models of *homonôia*, and between Arendt and Heidegger’s conceptions of the Greek city-state, to a meditation on the theatricality of the city-state itself. For Cassin, Heidegger confuses the city-state with the work of art and thus reifies it. Alongside Arendt, she distinguishes between the fabrication of a work and the realm of action. Arendt says: “The *polis* replaces art by elevating action to the highest rank in the *vita activa*, and by designating speech as what distinguishes humans from animals” (ES, 267). Cassin then turns to Heidegger’s conception of tragedy in his reading of Sophocles – since, she claims, it “sums up everything”. Heidegger identifies tragedy as the movement of *alethia*, of truth as unveiling, uncovering and withdrawal (ES, 268). In contrast, for Arendt, tragedy is “the political art par excellence” (*Human Condition*, 211 French edition). The reason given for this identity is that tragedy is the least reified imitation of action, the least reified imitation of those non-generalisable identities that are actors.

In following the line of enquiry in the third chapter on politics of part two of *L’effet sophistique*, we thus pass from the city-state as consensus brought about by a sophist’s performative discourse to Arendt’s meditation on why tragedy is a political art. These connections raise a simple question: where and how is the city-state a performance in the sense of an imitation of action? Does such a performance occur solely within the confines of a sophist’s speech and its audience’s reception and reaction? Does it occur solely for the length of the performance of a play and its echoing memory in the minds of the audience members? Or is it the case that the *polis* only ever exists as momentarily evoked in a discursive performance – its consistence not residing in some objective discourse-independent reality, but through being woven and re woven by every single reference to it, its functions and its institutions, in the mouths of Athenians? If that were the case, then it wouldn’t be the sophists’ speech in all of its sophistication, nor the tragedians’ play in all of its splendor, that mattered in determining the performativity of the city – such discursive events would be all too rare, all too rarefied, to have a sustained effect on collective belief in the city-state. Rather it would be the repeated everyday references to the city-state, in ordinary transactions and decisions, banal employments of collective norms, to how ‘we’ do things, that would do the lion’s share of the work. But then perhaps the problem with everyday discursive evocations of the city-state is that they enter into conflict, that they form part of the play of faction which Aristotle theorized at such length in Book V of the
Politics. The city is continually manifested, gestured at, presupposed, lamented and idealized in every neighbourhood, at every time of the day, but only to divide it, only to barbarize some other – welfare queen, bludger, undocumented migrant, islamo-gauchiste – who enjoys excessive spoils, way beyond their part in a proper distribution. The specificity of the successful sophists’ speech is that it unifies the city that it speaks of, that it brings about through its speech, by internalizing the centrifugal forces of faction, and by inventing a new consensus.

Cassin issues her own warning with regard to this idea of sophists’ speech producing consensus. It is quite possible for an old consensus to be revivified through the work of phrases that are in fact homonyms like ‘the will of the people’; that is to say, a phrase that can be filled in with just about any semantic content whatsoever, or with approval of any policy whatsoever. The use of such phrases, Cassin states, is the “paradigm of an entirely revolutionary ‘demagogic abuse’” (ES, 341). Evidently, a phrase being a homonymy is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition to specify demagogic speech. What possible distinction could Cassin make between the consensus produced by demagogy and the consensus invented by a sophists’ speech, such as that of Gorgias in his In Praise of Helen?

This is none other than the normative question, which was bound to emerge sooner or later given Cassin’s open adoption of a relativist position, and her avoidance of commitment to any of the premises of a philosophical ethics. Cassin appears to have two responses to this question. She often cites Gorgias on the production of consensus, and then turns to Protagoras, as ventriloquized by Socrates, in turn ventriloquized in the Theaetetus, who claims that discourse is to be used to make the city move from a worse to a better state, where better is better for someone, for the city, as judged by the ‘sage’ (Theaetetus, 167c; ES, 267). Cassin repeatedly refers to this passage in her work on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Of course, this kind of prescription leaves open the question of who exactly has been appointed or recognized, or elected themselves, to the position of the sage. It also leaves open the question of whether the change brought about is temporary or merely conjunctural.

The second response Cassin provides to the normative question is similar to Badiou’s: novelty or invention. In L’effet sophistique she makes the following claim about Gorgias’ Encomium of Helen: it presents a passage from the very idea of communion to invention, or from liturgy to that of happening (ES, 202). This claim is repeated and developed slightly in Quand dire c’est vraiment faire, the text on Austin’s performative, where she comments on the Encomium as follows:

It is a moment of political invention: performance consists primarily in passing from communion via the values of a community...to the creation of new values.

The first two paragraphs of In Praise of Helen testify to this passage and begin to carry it out...
This is how liturgy \((\text{kosmos, kallos, sophia, aretē, alētheia})\) opens onto a happening which performs another world; that is to say, through the manner in which a ‘me’ gives logismon [someone’s thoughts] to the logos [discourse, reason, ration] – ‘come pass from one to the other in my discourse’. (QD, 132-4)

Hence the response to the normative question is that a performative discourse helps move a political body from a worse to a better state by bringing about the invention of a new consensus. What is most significant in this passage is how Cassin binds the idea of political invention – the emergence of new collective values – to the idea of a happening. This reference to happenings – as some kind of absolute opposite to liturgy within a linear range or scale of theatrical activity – is never fleshed out: no talk of Allan Kaprow, of Robert Whitman or Claes Oldenburg, or all of recent work in performance studies on the re-enactment of happenings. So what status to accord to this signifier ‘happenings’ within Cassin’s writings? Is it an index, a signal to something outside Cassin’s text?

It just so happens that there is a string of other related concepts found in her writings: ‘kairos’ or the opportune moment, improvisation, the temporality of sophist discourse as escaping philosophy’s tendency to spatialize discourse.’ When Philostratus characterizes Gorgias’ sophistry he speaks of a discourse which is improvised in the moment, off the cuff, a discourse that unfolds solely in time, not even a thread to be followed since that would already be to spatialize it. She writes: “It is Gorgias who was at the origin of improvisation: stepping forwards in the theatre in Athens, he dared say “Propose!”, \(\text{probollete, ‘throw first’}\)” (AI, 42). This statement gives us a clear indication of how to flesh out Cassin’s reference to happenings. A performative discourse tends towards the pole of a happening, and away from any trace of liturgy, when it invites chance and the audience’s reaction into its own reception, and thus invites its audience to become fellow-speakers. In liturgy, the members of a community experience their unity and their force through the repetition of known rites, and the repeated imperative or question of the gap between shared faith and collective meaning and the actual codes and gestures of the rites. In a happening, in contrast, there are no known codes but fragmented ciphers to be interpreted – Why is that woman peeling oranges? What is a mountain of tyres? – and each person is no longer a member of a community but a subject of a common experience. This understanding of happenings gives us enough material for a third thesis on theatricality:

**THESIS 3: Theatricality occurs when the present moment is invaded and parasitized by the uncertainty and hazard of multiple futures.**

In other words, a discourse is performative both within and of the city-state when it opens up not just the possibility, but the manifest beginning, in the present moment, of multiple alternative futures – when we suddenly find ourselves in Borges’ ‘garden of forking paths’.
Yet the sophist seizes and opens up the present moment – *kairos* – not only through an exquisite sense of timing and sensibility, but also through the qualities of his or her voice.

**IV. Words as Bodies**

To explain sophistic discursivity, Cassin incessantly cites one of Gorgias’ declarations: “Discourse is a grand sovereign which, by means of the smallest and most non-evident of bodies, completes the most divine acts” (ES, 66). In Gorgias’ own example in *Praise of Helen*, words in the theatre are not substitutes for absent objects (as in ontology) but they directly produce passions in those who hear them (ES, 68).

Let us return to Cassin’s exploration of the figure of Helen and the passage in the *Odyssey* in which Helen’s actions during the war of Troy are recounted by Menelaus to his guests – after he and Telemachus have been drugged so as to moderate and mollify their reactions (*The Odyssey*, BkIV, verse 279; ES, 77). Recall: the wooden horse has been hauled inside the walls of Troy, Helen waits until nightfall, steals into the square where the horse stands. She alone was skeptical of sacred gifts from the enemy. Suspecting foul play and living surprises in the belly of the statue, she walked around the horse and called out to each of the soldiers huddling inside it in the voice of their wives, asking them to come down from the horse and to abandon their play: “yours was the voice of our long-lost wives” (*Odyssey*, IV, 313).

Cassin points out that in this passage Helen is presented as the general equivalent of all women (ES, 79). What is significant for our enquiry is her imitation of the unique sound of the voice of each of the Greek soldier’s wives. It is not the word in its semantic function that is acting as a body here, it is not even the word as a collection of phonemes, it is the word as sounded in a specific way, a sound that immediately recalls the ‘who’ of each of the soldier’s wives. Her voice is fiction, each of the wives she plays is a fiction, and their calls to their husbands are fiction, yet they exert an irresistible pull on the men.

What is theatre if not precisely such a machinery? As sounds, words are material bodies. Spoken words sway our passions, spoken words make-believe, spoken words open up unseen pasts and feared futures at the level of sense, but they do so each time through the actor’s voice. The actor plays with the sonority of words in time, according to a certain rhythm, in order to produce not only certain effects of sense, but also a question in the audience’s mind: who is speaking here? What is this person, this character capable of, given the sound of her voice? In live theatre – as all those have taken voice lessons know – the voice is produced through the actor’s body. Not only that, it is part of the actor’s body, part of their physicality and part of how that physicality radiates through space. Cassin’s exploration of Helen’s ventriloquism thus leads us to a fourth thesis on theatricality:
THEESIS 4: Theatricality occurs when the physical presence and sonority of the actor’s voice creates a desire for sense in those who hear it.

When Helen speaks as all women for the men, as the unique wife for each soldier hiding in the belly of a wooden horse, she makes-believe. Fiction is the final category of Cassin’s work which leads us towards theatricality.

V. Fiction and World-Making

As a sidenote to her lengthy analysis of Aristotle’s ‘decision of sense’, Cassin often remarks that a category for fiction is created: words, phrases or discourse that have meaning but no reference – “Any statement on an object that does not exist, like the goat-stag or a chimaera” (ES, 333; QD, 101). In L’effet sophistique she spends some time enquiring into the status of fiction between philosophy and the sophists. With reference to Aristotle’s concept of the ‘verisimilar’ in the Poetics, she remarks that Homer, above all, ‘taught others to tell lies in the right manner’; that is to say, the right kind of lies so that people believe them (ES, 475). Given this connection between belief and illusion she also claims that “poetry and sophistry are indiscernable when one maintains the Aristotelian position” (ES, 475). We could take this as just an example of Cassin playing at the blurring and multiplication of genres of discourse. However, what is also at stake here is precisely this concept of fiction as *making-believe*, one which reoccurs in the following passage:

‘Someone who produces illusions is more just than someone who doesn’t, and someone who believes in these illusions is wiser that someone who doesn’t, since being easily ravished by the pleasure of discourse is to not be deprived of sensibility.’ Plutarch transmitted this fragment to us as applying to tragedy. Justice, foundation of the city-state, wisdom, foundation of *paid-eia*, in their bond with tragedy. An intrication between literature, pedagogy and politics: this is what *plasma* leads to... (ES, 477)

Yet when we go to see a tragedy, why is it that we believe in Sophocles’ illusions? How is the author of a tragedy – and the actors, and the director – capable of making us believe in these illusions? Is it the employment of some special characters of the genre ‘tragedy’ or ‘comedy’? But surely the belief in theatre is not produced by words alone, but also by the singular way in which a few particular people move across a delimited space, *pace* Peter Brook? Or is our suspension of disbelief a mere product of the institutional conventions of theatre?

To be clear, this is not one of Cassin’s questions. But she does come very close to it in many passages in her work on Austin on the performative, *Quand dire c’est vraiment faire*. Her study opens with yet another ‘primitive scene’, one she baptizes the ‘pagan performative’. Ulysses, shipwrecked off the coast of Scheria, emerges naked and dripping from behind a bush to surprise the young princess Nausicaa and her handmaidens who had gone to the seashore to do some laundry.
In order to avoid shocking her further, he does not kneel and clasp her knees in the traditional gesture of the guest seeking hospitality, but he tells her “I take you by the knees” (Bk.6, l.149, 169). Cassin asks what are the conditions of felicity of Ulysses’ performative? For Austin with illocutory speech acts such as “I do” in a church, the felicity conditions are objective institutional conventions. Ulysses’ performative is felicitous, but there are no conventions that stipulate that one can speak of the gesture of a suppliant rather than actually make that gesture. Cassin’s answer is that the felicity condition of “I take you by the knees” is world-making, i.e. the fabrication of an entire cosmos. Moreover Cassin specifies an intersubjective condition as the distinctive or constitutive characteristic of the pagan cosmos: "whoever you come across could be a God" (QD, 69). In other words, in Homer’s world the relationships between humans, gods and animals are porous or permeable (QD, 64). She writes: ‘Animal, plant, man, woman, god, an undecidability that is decidable each time, a mobile flux of interactions of identity which make up the beauty of the world: there must be a kosmos to speak in the way Ulysses speaks” (QD, 72). Indeed, time and time again in the Odyssey quick assumptions about who one has just encountered are shown to be mistaken at best and dangerous at worst.

In our second thesis on theatricality we said theatricality occurs when the ‘who’ is opened up as a question with unplumbed depths. This is quite evidently at stake in the meeting between Ulysses and Nausicaa.

But Cassin’s position is complicated because unlike institutional conventions of the church, of royalty, of juridical or political institutions, Homer’s pagan cosmos does not pre-exist or exist independently of Ulysses’ speech. Indeed Cassin repeatedly asks what is the world-making effect of individual performatives like ‘I take you by the knees’? How is it that discourse, in Gorgias’ words, ‘with the smallest and least apparent of bodies, performs the most divine works’? (QD, 82).

In other words, the pagan cosmos is not only the felicity condition of performatives like that of Ulysses’, but such performatives also contribute to creating that pagan cosmos. The pagan cosmos does not exist elsewhere than as evoked and signified by the words spoken by Homer’s characters and narrator. In a certain sense, the poem creates its own conditions of felicity at the same time as presupposing them. My contention is that this oscillation between a presupposed or independent condition of felicity for performatives – a pagan cosmos – and an internally generated condition of felicity, dependent precisely on the spoken words and performatives that evoke it, is characteristic of theatricality.

This is all the more the case once one joins Cassin and Austin in shifting from Austin’s first taxonomy of speech acts to his second taxonomy. To cut a long story short, Austin adopts an initial taxonomy in which he simply distinguishes between classic statements that afirm or describe a state of affairs – constatives – and this new category of statements he says we need to recognize: all those statements that bring about a change in the world when they are enunciated. He calls them ‘performatives’. He explores this distinction between constatives and performatives in his first five lectures and attempts, without much success,
to identify the criterion which characterizes all performatives. During lectures eight to ten Austin develops a new distinction within the overall category of performatives between perlocutionary acts (in which a change is produced by saying something) and illocutionary acts (in which a change is produced in saying something). In the twelfth and final lecture Austin relegates his initial taxonomy of constatives and performatives to the position of being a ‘special case’ and adopts a second taxonomy of locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary statements. Cassin reads this moment as a ‘sea-change’ in his approach in that he abandons the attempt to create a strictly defined category of statements that are performatives. In her interpretation of Austin, she claims that at that moment he moves to a general theory of all discourse as performative, and this is precisely when he reinvents the position of the sophists. Of course, there is an immediate risk: “In the *Differend*, Lyotard notes that the term performance risks becoming so enlarged that it ‘loses its capacity to designate a specific regime of phrases’. This is precisely the risk that we have taken” (QD, 243). Our question is, once all discourse is recognized as performative, as having its own ‘world-effect’, how can the specificity of the theatrical performative be identified?

Cassin gives us a suggestion. With regard to rhetoric understood via Austin’s category of a perlocutionary, she says the ‘unity of measure’ for perlocutory acts cannot be the statement alone, since a perlocutory act – doing something by saying something – depends on the relationship between speaker and listener and the entire discourse (QD, 104). With reference to the sophistic genre par excellence, the eulogy or rather the hymn of praise, positioned “in excess” of both philosophy and rhetoric as understood by philosophy, she says “An epideixis does not describe in terms of truth, it does not produce solely an effect of persuasion, but it brings about, with felicity, what I call an effect-world” (QD, 96). What happens then with theatre? Like epideixis it brings about, with felicity, an effect-world – in Sophocles and Shakespeare and Beckett as much as in Homer. Like perlocutory acts, it does something due to the relationship between speaker and listener – actor and audience (or the other actors) – and the entire discourse. But in theatre the ‘entire discourse’ includes the stage, the wings, the auditorium, and the physicality and spacing of the actors’ bodies and voices. In addition – here we are tying many threads together – Cassin says of fiction: “a fiction is always a lie that knows itself to be a lie; to say it in a far more precise manner, in Greek in which this question was thematized by the second sophistic: a plasma is a pseudos that knows itself to be pseudos” (QD, 236). So in theatre an effect-world is created into which the actors and audience plunge, yet at the very same time they are quite aware that this world is a lie that knows itself to be a lie, make-believe that knows itself to be make-believe. Let us tie in one more thread. In response to the initial scene of this paper where Plato has the playwrights and actors expelled and banned from the hypothetical just city, Cassin prefers Aristotle’s more ‘sophistical’ account of a consistent polis, due to his accentuation of plurality as its constitutive condition, and she also prefers his concept of the place of theatre in that city:
For Plato, in the Republic, Homer and Hesiod are *muthopoioi*, makers of grand narratives; "they lie badly", *mê kalôs*, "that's not beautiful". Let's expel them: Homer out! Aristotle, in contrast, in the *Poetics*, makes lies into the heart of that theatre which we need so as to become a community of citizens. (QD, 71)

She returns to this point in the concluding pages of the book:

I have an unshakeable belief in the necessity of rethinking our contemporary misadventures with the help of the *pseudos* – one word alone for saying together “false and lie” – and performance – to make what one says exist – thus of the flirtation between poetry, literature, philosophy, history and politics. Let’s remember the spinal column of the history of philosophy. Plato: Homer and Hesiod lie badly, they are politically dangerous. Aristotle: Homer lies appropriately, he organizes the grand theatre of the city. (QD, 240)

The grand theatre of the city is evoked through the little theatre of a play or a happening that we go and see. But this play or happening doesn’t always convince us and we don’t recommend it to our friends: something was off whether it was the actors, the staging, the space, the story, or the audience’s reaction. Other times, a play does work in that an effect-world is created. This effect-world, this cosmos, is specifically one in which its make-believe is known to be make-believe. Moreover, there is no one criterion at the level of the statement or the type of enunciation that secures a felicity condition of the construction of this world. Rather it is at the level of the whole of a theatrical performance that its felicity condition is secured – it requires a precise combination of actors’ voices and bodies interacting in a precise manner within a very particular space so as to open up a shared imaginary space, with lighting, the set, the position of the spectators, and the rhythm of the words and gestures all playing their own role. At the same time, and this oscillation is characteristic of theatricality, it is also single performative utterances – "Now is the winter of our discontent" – that open up a world. It just so happens that it is precisely this oscillation between the local and the global, between a single line and something rotten in the whole of the state of Denmark, that is at stake in the relation between the little theatre and the grand theatre of the body-politic. Both Plato and Aristotle saw this: there is a metonymy at the heart of theatre between it and the city-state, a metonymy that is fundamentally fictional.

Tying all these threads together, perhaps we can try one last thesis on theatricality:

**THESIS 5:** Theatricality occurs when a single spoken line, a single gesture, aimed at other actors, both presupposes and generates a shared make-believe world that is known to be make-believe, a single spoken make-believe world that both presupposes and generates the shared body-politic as subject to knowing make-believe.

This how lying risks becoming a blood-sport.
Oliver Feltham: ‘Lying is a bloodsport’

Notes

1. Barbara Cassin, *L’Effet sophistique* (Paris: Gallimard, 1995), p.35. Henceforth all references to this text will be signalled in the body of the essay with the abbreviation ‘ES’ and a page number. The bloodsport Cassin refers to is none other than Gorgias’ parody of Parmenides “being is being”, a parody which undoes the apparent identity and throws the entire history of philosophy, and hence the very profession of those who would still call themselves ‘philosophers’, into deep confusion.

2. Readers who are familiar with Heidegger’s ‘destruction of metaphysics or ontotheology’ and Derrida’s deconstruction of the metaphysics of presence, or even Deleuze’s writing of a minor history of philosophy should have their ears pricking up about now.

3. Cassin writes, "I employ the term 'effet sophistique' [the effect of sophistics] to indicate the way in which a sophistical history of philosophy makes the history of philosophy tremble" (*Aristote et le logos* 4; hereafter AL).

4. "that violent critique of ontology that constitutes sophistics" (AL, 4).

5. I know a song which annoys people: "I know a song which annoys people: ‘….’.”

6. "J’aimerais sur le papier comme mettre en scène cette Hélène en distendant la vection platonicienne et la vection sophistique" (ES, 82).


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