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NOTHING IN COMMON

Richard Wright, James Baldwin, Jacques Lacan

The human subject is prone to all manner of ingenuity in order to flee the truth that speaks in her symptoms. Before psychoanalysis, this was understood by philosophy, which has repeatedly set as its task the dispelling of illusions, the demand for the individual's awakening. Cartesian doubt was to secure the border between dreams and reality; Kant wanted to stir thinkers from the "dogmatic slumber" of an insufficiently critical weltanschauung; Husserlian phenomenology sought to guide "the waking ego" by "bracketing" commonsense reality. Beginning with dream analysis, psychoanalysis has assumed such ethics of awakening as its own orientation. Jacques Lacan, as Roberto Harari writes, "has always maintained that his motto, his task, and his determination have been to bring about the awakening of the speaking beings" (p. 74). As in Husserl, the oneiric world whose ground needs undermining is that of everyday reality: "Now, it is clear that what precedes the awakening is the state of sleep—obviously, the state of sleep we are in when we are awake, for we live in a state bordering collective sleep in which the truths characteristic of each of us remain lethargic" (p. 74). The primary ethical task of psychoanalysis is to deprive humankind of dreamworlds' delusive comfort: it is only by interrupting our sleep that we can glimpse the truth of our being.

It is in the context of such ethical imperative—of "wanting to wake men up from their dreams" (Lacan, "Direction", p. 521)—that we should read Lacan's claim, in *Seminar XX*, that masculine desire entails "the jouissance of the idiot [*la jouissance de l'idiot*]" (p. 81 / p. 103; see also p. 94). Via some etymological punning, Lacan is, I think, teasing us with an allusion to an ancient text. *Idios*, which Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott translate as "personal", "private", "separate", "distinct", "peculiar", or "strange" (p. 326), is famously used by Heraclitus to distinguish between the worlds of wakefulness and sleep:

> The world of the waking is one and shared, but the sleeping turn aside each into his private world. (Fragment VI; Kahn, p. 31)

Heraclitus compares the sleeper's solitary *idios kosmos* to the *koinos kosmos* of a "common", "shared", "public" world.[1] Many philosophers have followed him in insisting that shared waking experiences must be distinguished from the deceptive idiosyncrasies of sleep and oneiric life. Lacan evokes this history in characterizing masculine jouissance as "idiotic." Masculine desire is the desire of the dreamer, paralyzed in his relation to the *objet a*, the fascinating semblant in the mirror.[2] Here emerges the center around which Lacan seeks to reorient our onto-ethics. What is it that we share such that can be taken as our joint frame of reference, our common ground? How do we avoid the idiocy of imaginary games and affirm a common good? How can what Aristotle calls *to koinon agathon (Politica*, III.6-7 [pp. 1184-86]) be made available in the modern world?

"There is no more basic question in political thinking", Simon Goldhill writes, "than what is shared, what is 'common,' the 'common good,' the ties that bind us" (p. 248). Psychoanalysis shares the question of *koinon* with two thinkers whose work I will explore here: James Baldwin and, as Baldwin's interlocutor, Richard Wright. Throughout their careers, Baldwin and Wright sought that which might remain of the shared good in the modern world, which they, like many other African-diasporic intellectuals and artists, saw marked at its origin by the tragic error of our flight from freedom and the consequent convolutions of bad faith. If we have been told that the common (*koinon*) that grounds communities (*koinônia*) undergoes a radical reorganization when the presumably steady traditions of feudal societies disappear into the alienation inherent in merchant capitalism and then industrial labor, representatives of the diasporic intellectual tradition where we find Baldwin and Wright argue that "modern life", in all of its malaise, "begins with slavery" (Morrison, p. 178). Such accounts point out that the historical shifts precipitated by the rise of Lutheran inwardness and the eradication of feudal communities in the sixteenth century were simultaneous with the beginning of the transatlantic slave trade and the first wave of European colonialism. If the modern era is frequently considered to have precipitated our stirring from the *idios kosmos* of traditions—what Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, suggestively for us, call "the idiocy of rural life" (p. 477)—to the shared values of reason and individualism, observers like Baldwin and Wright argue that this awakening only gave way to another dream, another delusion. The modern subject could not afford to remain fully awake to the ethical ramifications of the events that oriented the era at its origin. Contaminated from the beginning, diasporic modernity has consequently failed to provide the hard ground on which *to koinon agathon* could be established. Instead, we moderns have long been sleepwalkers, enveloped in our unshareable dreams, unable to reach beyond our monadic confinement.

With the alarm clock of its famous opening, Wright's debut novel, *Native Son* (1940), attempts to break through to diasporic modernity's somnambulists and establish the common ground that would allow us to recognize and negotiate the pathologies symptomized in the crime that the novel's protagonist feels compelled to commit. The Aristotelian question of *to koinon agathon* is explicitly addressed when,

toward the end of the novel, Bigger Thomas fleetingly realizes that, in manipulating his enemies' perceptions after Mary Dalton's disappearance, he has but affirmed inauthentic existence. Sitting in his cell, he envisions a world where he could share the "common and good" with others across varied differences (p. 362). Bigger's condition is a characteristically modern one in that it is marked by this radical lack of connection. Deprived of anything shared, he is, as his lawyer says, "'confoundingly alone,'" without a "'common vision'" or "'common hope'" or "'common path'" (*Native*, p. 401). Writing his novel in the late 1930s, Wright suggests that in the twentieth century the questions of *koinon* and *koinônia* are more crucial than ever: deprived of any *koinos kosmos*, individuals like Bigger will save their lives from the nightmare of modern isolation by turning to fascism, its promise of a binding operation that will compensate for the modern subject's radical solitude.[3] Like Wright, Baldwin and Lacan write in the shadow of the horrors that by mid-twentieth century had been revealed about the dialectic of Enlightenment; it is the specter of the totalitarian nightmare from which Europe is barely awakening that in large part motivate their work.

If *Native Son*'s opening boasts of one of twentieth-century literature's most famous scenes of awakening, Baldwin too mobilizes the trope in several of his texts. Largely continuing Wright's analysis of diasporic modernity's failure of wakefulness, he calls the set of experiences he sees waiting for us in the waking world "*real* life", an existential mode entirely unavailable to anyone inhabiting the world of mirrors where Bigger, like an idiot, enjoys his games. Bigger is the dreamer who, inhabiting *idios kosmos*, finds himself compelled to wage "a permanent 'it's you or me' form of war", a battle whose outcome will be, in fact, "neither you nor me" (Lacan, "Freudian", p. 356). As much as Lacan here describes the deadly repetitions of violence elicited by one's imaginary semblant, Baldwin is concerned to calculate the cost of our having identified, in lust and rage, with the double that we find in diasporic modernity's mirror.

Like Wright and Baldwin, who seek the modes of commonness available in diasporic modernity, Lacan, at a crucial turning point in his career, makes it his task to rethink Aristotelian ethics based on the Freudian revolution. If Lacanian psychoanalysis allows for the possibility of a shared experience, any wakeful togetherness must proceed from the feminine side. Yet the proposition of feminine *koinon* is complicated by the ontological impossibility of the sexual relation, the most central of tenets in Lacan's thought. Before he impugns the desiring movement on the masculine side as an idiot's venture,[4] the project of thinking sexual difference emerges as a central concern for Lacan in his seminar of 1959-60, whose title announces a new emphasis in his teaching: from here on out, it is *the ethics of psychoanalysis* that will take center stage in his work. Like many thinkers before him, he turns to Sophocles' play *Antigone* for its ethical lessons, particularly as these concern the question of the common good. As Goldhill writes, "understanding *to koinon* is the most pressing imperative of [*Antigone*'s] interrogation of family and politics" (p. 246). Yet the task is tricky, for many of Sophocles' heroes are, in

Heraclitus' terms, idiots. Commentators have often noted that Antigone's obstinate disregard of the shared good of the *polis* approaches the solipsistic madness of an oneiric state. In her stubbornness, which from the start foretells her fate, she is, as Lacan puts it, characterized by a "special solitude", a "separat[ion] … from the structure" (*Sem. VII*, p. 271)—the lack of relation that Heraclitus identifies in the *idios kosmos* of slumber. She is not alone in this amidst Sophoclean characters. Lacan points to Ajax, who, after a murderous rampage, "awakens from his craziness, is overcome with shame, and goes and kills himself in a corner" (*Sem. VII*, p. 271). No commonsense appeal can reach Ajax in the psychotic nightmare of his rage. Yet if Antigone, a hothead like Ajax, lives in her own dream, it is a world paradoxically organized by the call of the *koinon*, the very word, spoken by her, that opens the play.

Lacan's commentary on *Antigone* has been tackled by numerous scholars; particularly in the 1990s, the sessions on Sophocles in *Seminar VII* functioned as something of a pivot on which scholarship shifted from its earlier focus on the "imaginary" and "symbolic" aspects of Lacan's theorization to considering his exploration of "the real" of human experience.[5] I add to these readings by bringing Lacan's ethics into conversation with Wright's and (particularly) Baldwin's analyses of the deadly discontent that marks mid-century Europe and the United States. I propose that the oeuvres' mutual gravitational pull across different cultural contexts allows us to tease out the ways in which Lacan and Baldwin explore the issue of *koinon*, which they show to have accrued an unprecedented urgency because of what the events in Europe have demonstrated about the condition of Western modernity. As such, Wright's, Baldwin's, and Lacan's oeuvres figure as bodies in what Walter Benjamin and Theodor Adorno would call a "constellation", an assemblage whose various components, although not tending toward a synthesis, draw out from each other aspects that might otherwise remain implicit or unactualized. As a methodology, the construction of constellations taps into, as Martin Jay writes, "the value of jarring juxtapositions rather than the sublation of negations into positive mediations" (p. xvi). The constellation of Baldwin/Lacan highlights in the work of the two thinkers the question of the common, which, as Jennifer Gaffney as well as Pierre Dardot and Christian Laval have, in different ways, demonstrated, remains a crucial ethico-political issue in twentieth- and twenty-first-century modernity.

Wand of Fear: Richard Wright

Native Son's narrative unfolds as a series of tragicomic accidents and misunderstandings bred by deeply ingrained racial ideologies. No sooner is Bigger Thomas employed as a chauffeur by the white, liberal Daltons than he accidentally kills Mary, the daughter of the family. To keep her from revealing his presence, he suffocates the drunk girl with a pillow when her blind mother chances upon the pair in the girl's darkened bedroom. Having decapitated and incinerated her body, he craftily frames Mary's communist boyfriend for her disappearance, but is exposed

when her remains are discovered. After a brief escape, he is caught, tried, and, at the end of the narrative, sentenced to death.

In his courtroom speech, the lawyer Boris Max sketches a history of Western modernity with which he seeks to explain modern life's inconsistencies, symptomized, as he says, in the "fear" and "guilt" (or "fear-guilt" [*Native*, p. 390]) of which Bigger's crime and the reaction it has elicited are but the latest manifestation. According to the lawyer, at its moment of emergence, Western modernity was contaminated by something he calls "'a first wrong,'" that is, the establishment of a slave economy of an unprecedented scale (p. 387). The unacknowledged ramifications of this historical event haunt modern American life, endowing it with a sense of unreality. Max's effort in explicating his client's life is to precipitate a collective awakening: "'I say, Your Honor, that the mere act of understanding Bigger Thomas will be a thawing out of icebound impulses, a dragging of the sprawling forms of dread out of the night of fear into the light of reason, an unveiling of the unconscious ritual of death in which we, like sleep-walkers, have participated so dream-like and thoughtlessly'" (p. 383). He admonishes his listeners to leave behind the deadly dream-logic that they, dwelling in the darkness of guilt and fear, have acted out like so many somnambulists.

Wright elaborates the argument he assigns to Max—that the original sin of slavery, supplementing modernity's emergence, has distorted life into oneiric delusions—in a short text published five years after *Native Son*. In the introduction to St. Clair Drake and Horace R. Cayton's *Black Metropolis: A Study of Negro Life in a Northern City* (1945), he posits that Europeans committed a *tragic error* as they, awoken from the traditions of feudalism—"the slumberous feudal world" (p. xxv)—faced what he suggests, echoing many existentialist thinkers, was the abyss of freedom. Their mistake consisted of the enslavement of Africans in an effort to secure their futures in the suddenly unpredictable world of change and becoming. The error subsequently necessitated convoluted rationalizations, designed to placate Europeans' consciences about enslavement, that radically undermined the promise of reason at the very point of the modern world's emergence. If modernity is marked by reason, then Wright suggests that we have never been modern, for our contamination by irrationality occurred at the era's origin. This ambivalence is symptomized in the debut novel. While *Native Son* is often thought to be urging the awakening of its audiences to the hidden realities of life in twentieth-century United States, it evokes the "unreality" of modern life to the extent that some readers have considered it a dream narrative (see JanMohamed, pp. 27, 77-79, 96, 275).

While Wright's novel opens with the ringing of the alarm clock in the Thomases' kitchenette, a perhaps more important awakening occurs at the beginning of its second part as Bigger Thomas opens his eyes on the morning after Mary Dalton's death. Oddly under-analyzed in Wright scholarship, this moment amounts to the kind of awakening that various traditions of thought have not only identified as an ethical imperative but also suggested is a near-impossibility. The difficulty is indicated by the fact that, although "wide awake", Bigger is unable to fully surface

from sleep; he remains submerged, not quite asleep, not quite awake, conscious but unable to resume his place in the waking world. He "sees" and "hears", but fails to synthesize the various "unrelated" sensory experiences into "reality and meaning":

> He saw the room and saw snow falling past the window; but his mind formed no image of any of these. They simply existed, unrelated to each other; the snow and the daylight and the soft sound of breathing cast a strange spell upon him, a spell that waited for the wand of fear to touch it and endow it with reality and meaning. He lay in bed, only a few seconds from deep sleep, caught in a deadlock of impulses, unable to rise to the land of the living. (p. 97)

Suspended between realms, he cannot find his way back to the life he knows, but is, instead, enveloped in the haze of "a strange spell." Yet this proprioceptive disorientation may in fact be the dazed bafflement of a person coming to. Laying on his bed, bereft of that which he recognizes as his waking life, Bigger is on the cusp of understanding that what he has taken for "reality" has in fact been the product of a conjuring trick, a magic spell woven by a "wand of fear." He waits for this wand to do its customary work and yield "reality and meaning" to his existence. It turns out that the world the novel's previous part (called "Fear") has detailed has been the result of such magic and that the odd "spell" that paralyzes Bigger upon awakening is but his laborious surfacing from this oneiric reality. Bigger's panicked inability to find his bearings in a world that he would recognize is that of the sleepwalker, suddenly awake, in the midst of an unfamiliar environment. He feels what Mari Ruti, in her discussion of Lacanian ethics, calls "a rare experiential nudge—an awakening to life that ruptures the coordinates of what we have hitherto understood to be life" (p. 36).

Such scenes of reality's disintegration are familiar as descriptions of the modern individual's emergence: one becomes free to become oneself, but at the cost of having all criteria by which the authenticity of experience can be guaranteed evaporate. The scene of awakening suggests that an authentic universality can be achieved only by a risky unraveling of all extant modes of being, the loss of whatever one thought holds the world together. Bigger discovers that the components of his world have become "unrelated to each other." Such experience of unrelatedness—the individual's, as well as that of the world's constituent parts—is the condition of modern *koinon*.

Had Lacan read *Native Son*, he might have designated the moment of Bigger's awakening with a term he borrows from Aristotle's *Physics*: *tuché*. Aristotle identifies two modes of chance, *automaton* and *tuché*, which Lacan connects, respectively, with the symbolic order and the real. While *automaton* evinces the pressure of the signifier in the subject—one might think of naturalist novels as stories of worlds monopolized by this mode of chance—*tuché* designates a moment when the real disorients the structure: it constitutes "an encounter with the real" (*Sem. XI*, pp. 52-55). But we must understand this not as an intrusion of an outside into the symbolic

order, but as an internal failure, a "short circuit" (as Slavoj Žižek might say) created by the system itself. Bigger's awakening to the ruse of symbolic reality results not from his transgression of its laws, but, on the contrary, from his full obeisance to the law's characterization of his being; he slips from the law's grasp because he has fully enacted his symbolic role as a Black criminal. Conceptualized thus, the real is not pure externality but a product of symbolic operations. Such paradoxical relationship between the symbolic and the real necessitates not only Lacan's turn to topology, but also his coinage "*extimité*" to describe the inside/outside torsion of the human world.[6]

Bigger rapidly overcomes the dislocation of his awakening and, feeling empowered, learns to exert his mastery of the situation. He deploys the lure of his Blackness to throw the investigators off the scent. Utilizing what Lacan in "The Mirror Stage" calls the "paranoiac knowledge" structuring imaginary relations (p. 76), he is able to fool his surroundings for a while by anticipating, through identification, the actions of the investigators and journalists digging into Mary's disappearance. He manipulates others' misrecognitions to his advantage: the detective Britten cannot imagine that a dumb Black boy could orchestrate a kidnapping; Mr. Dalton has averted his gaze from the problem and, instead, relies for his salvation on the good works of giving ping-pong tables to the poor; Jan is blinded by his idealized vision of Black folk as communists' natural allies. While Bigger, like the Minister in Edgar Allan Poe's tale, realizes that the winning strategy consists of one's "acting like an idiot [*faire l'idiot*]" (Lacan, "Seminar on 'The Purloined Letter,'" p. 43 / p. 59),[7] the player simultaneously courts the risk of the idiocy that Lacan, in *Seminar XX*, assigns to masculine desire, the risk of his capture in the tight dialectic of a game of masks. And, indeed, as soon as Bigger is released from the imaginary trap of "fear", he is "captivated by [another] dyadic relationship" ("Seminar on 'The Purloined Letter,'" p. 22). Hardly has he occupied the role of Poe's Auguste Dupin, who, from behind his green glasses, can surreptitiously observe the crime scene, before the world gets clued onto his deception. Immobilized by the magic of his own conjuring, he finds himself, like the sorcerer's apprentice, "under a strange spell, possessed by a force which he hated, but which he had to obey" (*Native*, p. 172). Not long after he has the experience of having woken up to his self after the crime, he is gripped by another oneiric terror: "Events were like the details of a tortured dream, happening without a cause" (p. 199). When he finally gives up the game, he feels "tense inside", "as though he had been compelled to hold himself in a certain awkward posture for a long time and then when he had the chance to relax he could not" (p. 232). Like the corporeal mimicry Roger Caillois discusses in an essay that influenced Lacan's theory of subject formation, his game of deception "has caught the sorcerer in his own trap" (Caillois, p. 98).[8]

In psychoanalytic terms, the resolute swiftness with which Bigger maps the "new world" (*Native*, p. 241) that opens before him constitutes his ethical failure. He asserts control with an eagerness that psychoanalysis warns us against. Lacan advises analysts in training to resist entering into a "relationship of understand-

ing" ("Situation", p. 394) with their patients, for such understanding constitutes but an "inconsistent mirage" (*Sem. III*, p. 7). Relationships of keen understanding are likely to be ones of imaginary misrecognition; they entail the kind of identification and mastery that characterize the practices of American ego psychology. "The speed of comprehension", as Harari paraphrases Lacan's clinical advice, "leaves us fascinated with reality" (p. 99), the very reality that Lacan suggests needs to be dispelled like a dream. If Bigger's world before the killing, its "reality and meaning", turns out to have been a fearful illusion, after the *tuché* of his crime he, unable to *take his time*, becomes immobilized—paralytically *fascinated*—in front of another mirror, enveloped by another dreamworld.

Real Life/Real Death: James Baldwin

For James Baldwin, Bigger Thomas is indelibly sutured into the dialectic of "fear", unable to imagine a life beyond a simple reversal of the white world's violence, beyond a momentarily successful counter-incantation to what the Nation of Islam spokespersons call white supremacy's "tricknology."[9] Notwithstanding the blink of an eye in which he experiences his world's total disintegration upon awakening after Mary's death, Bigger never emerges from the dream of terror that organizes his life before the killing; he merely reverses, and then only momentarily, the terms of the contract that have stipulated his fate (the title of *Native Son*'s third and final part). He remains, as Baldwin writes, in "a deadly, timeless battle" ("Everybody's", p. 18). As such, Wright's vision anticipates that of the Nation of Islam, in which Baldwin sees the mere continuation of white supremacy's oneiric logic: "The dream, the sentiment is old", he writes of NOI's ideology, "only the color is new" (*Fire*, p. 319). Whether with Bigger's epiphany or the Nation of Islam, the agents of one's coming-to-consciousness may but extend the spell where one is paralyzed by the sight of the enemy in the mirror. Contrary to appearances, the dream continues unbroken.

Nowhere does Baldwin note the minimal opening that Bigger's awakening on the morning after Mary's death constitutes; yet he goes on to offer the nightmare's dispelling as a paradigmatic moment of an ethical realization. With its titular reference to Wright's novel, his essay "Notes of a Native Son" (1955) recalls the teenage Baldwin's first encounter with an explicit, Southern-style racism as he is working on a construction site in New Jersey.[10] One night, after a series of racist humiliations, he is gripped by what he calls a "rage in [the] blood", a murderousness with which, Baldwin writes, every Black person in the United States is familiar ("Notes", p. 70). Enveloped by an oneiric sense of unreality ("an optical illusion, or a nightmare", p. 70), he walks into a restaurant that he knows to be segregated, waits to be served, and, when a waitress refuses to seat him, throws a glass of water at her. Instead of hitting her, the glass breaks a mirror behind the counter, at which point the young man awakens:

> with that sound, my frozen blood abruptly thawed, I returned from wherever I had been, I *saw*, for the first time, the restaurant, the people with their mouths open, already, as it seemed to me, rising as one man, and I realized what I had done, and where I was, and I was frightened. (pp. 71-72)

Baldwin echoes Wright in this description. The moment of his "frozen blood abruptly thaw[ing]" amounts to the kind of awakening that Boris Max tells the court must take place in the nation, "'a thawing out of icebound impulses'" (*Native*, p. 383), allegorized in the icy city across which Bigger flees. Afterwards, as Baldwin replays the events, the scene returns to him in the form of the repetition compulsion that frequently attends traumas' aftermaths:

> I lived it over and over and over again, the way one relives an automobile accident after it has happened and one finds oneself alone and safe. I could not get over two facts, both equally difficult for the imagination to grasp, and one was that I could have been murdered. But the other was that I had been ready to commit murder. I saw nothing very clearly but I did see this: that my life, my *real* life, was in danger, and not from anything other people might do but from the hatred I carried in my own heart. (p. 72)

Although autobiographical, the scene should be read as a retelling of Bigger's deadly encounter with Mary Dalton and her blind mother. The glass of water misses not only the waitress but, more importantly, the true object of the young man's anger: not unlike the tragic Okonkwo in Chinua Achebe's *Things Fall Apart* (1958), in his rage Baldwin almost commits the hamartia of killing the messenger, the "frightened" waitress who speaks to him with "a note of apology in her voice", as if "repeat[ing lines] she ha[s] learned … somewhere." This is how, Baldwin suggests, the tragedy of American race relations perpetuates itself: blinded by rage, fascinated by the contingent embodiment of an impersonal history, the young man is on the cusp of joining the unwitting performers of diasporic modernity's tragic scripts. As Baldwin repeatedly tells us, his adoptive father unfailingly excels in such misdirected, rageful performances; Bigger Thomas similarly embodies the paradigmatic victim/perpetrator of the hopeless dialectic that is about to engulf the narrator of "Notes of a Native Son." The server is a Mary Dalton, a well-meaning but clueless messenger from beyond enemy lines, unable to fully understand the role she plays for the Black man. Everyone acts out, more or less unknowingly, the choreographies that Wright deems to have been established to adapt to the error committed at the modern era's emergence.

Importantly, Baldwin makes a point of noting that the awakening in the restaurant was to the jeopardy not primarily of his physical survival but of what he calls his "*real* life." *Real* life will have been lost whether the young man survives the confrontation or not; it is a mode of living beyond the scripts that position him and the waitress as doppelgängers and mortal enemies, a world of potential of which Bigger gets an inkling amidst the confusion of his sudden awakening after the killing that the young Baldwin narrowly avoids repeating. *Real* life is always in danger

of being lost in the paranoid politics of otherness that allows Bigger the delusion of agency while, simultaneously, sealing his doom. Bigger never escapes what Baldwin at a later moment calls "*real* death", echoing, italics and all, his phrase from "Notes of a Native Son." In a 1970 interview in *Essence*, he recalls his escape to France: "I arrived [in Paris] with $40, scared to death, not knowing what I was going to do, but knowing that whatever was going to happen here would not be worse than what was certainly going to happen in America. Here I was in danger of death; but in America it was not a danger; it was certainty. Not just physical death, I mean *real* death" ("Conversation", p. 24, emphasis in original).[11] "*Real* death" threatens to abolish "*real* life"; it is this annihilation that Baldwin flees to Europe. He may be alluding to his own expatriate experience when, in the late novel *Just above My Head* (1979), he describes Arthur Montana's time in Paris. Having escaped his native country, where "all his senses were always alert for danger" (p. 925), Arthur (Baldwin's middle name) finds himself "luxuriously wide awake" (p. 943) in the French capital. Rather than, as we tend to think, designating an alertness to danger, "wakefulness" names one's availability to the world's surprises, a "luxury."

As the echoes of *Native Son* in Baldwin's restaurant scene suggest, Bigger Thomas is eagerly embracing his *real* death. Particularly after Abdul JanMohamed's reading of Wright's oeuvre in *The Death-Bound-Subject: Richard Wright's Archaeology of Death* (2005), we are likely to link this *real* death to the concept of "social" or "symbolic" death. Turning to Orlando Patterson's and Lacan's rereadings of the Hegelian master-slave dialectic, JanMohamed argues that the slave's "social death", a characteristic Patterson identifies in numerous slave economies, has continued to determine African American life in twentieth-century United States, where racialized subjects have been "formed, from infancy on, by the imminent and ubiquitous threat of death" (p. 2). Such lives are marked by the aporia that Patterson, referring to Hegel, assigns the slave: in order to live, the subject must accept his (social) death, a condition that leaves him nothing to lose but his biological life. Yet his literal acceptance of this life can also precipitate a revolutionary reversal: the subject can make the suicidal choice of identifying with and acting out the murderous fantasies that have constituted his subjectivity. JanMohamed persuasively argues that we should read Wright's oeuvre as the author's career-long analysis of the death-bound condition from various angles.[12]

Yet what Baldwin means by *real* death must be distinguished from the concept of symbolic death that JanMohamed distils from Wright, Patterson, and Lacan. The revolutionary potential that Lacanians see in "social death" emerges when the subject, in an "insane" gesture, embraces the law that stipulates her death. In his ethics, Baldwin, on the other hand, seems to exclude the "subjective destitution" or "choice of death" that many Lacanians have elevated into the ethical act *par excellence*. Not that he is unfamiliar with such strategies. He writes in 1951: "there exists among the intolerably degraded the perverse and powerful desire to force into the arena of the actual those fantastic crimes of which they have been accused, of achieving their vengeance and their own destruction through making

the nightmare real" ("Many", p. 29). But while he occasionally recognizes the disruptive potential available to anyone who would suicidally turn social death into an "answer of the real", he refuses the politics that JanMohamed considers Wright to have consistently explored and embraced.

Instead, the failed *real*ness of American life has produced "'a nation of sleepwalkers,'" as Baldwin has one of his characters say (*Just*, p. 543). These are people who, like the "sleep-walkers" Boris Max sees somnambulating the streets of Chicago, spend their days under, and "are terrified of waking from", the spell of their "radiant dream" (Baldwin, "Lockridge", p. 591) or, as Baldwin rephrases, "radiant stupor" (*Evidence*, p. 42). Echoing Freud's point about the atemporality of the unconscious, Baldwin suggests that, like all oneiric worlds, American life fails to be organized by time. Most Americans, he writes, "have yet to discover … that time is real" ("They", p. 637). Sealed in *idios kosmos*, the modern subject lives outside shared time. Bigger is a figure for such atemporal solitude. He is the modern being who, as the story often goes, emerged into its haunted life after the eradication of the shared experiences of tradition, religion, and family in the world's reorganization according to the labor demands of industrialized, secular modernity. In his cell, Bigger imagines the world as a prison of solitary confinement: "he saw a black sprawling prison full of tiny black cells in which people lived; each cell had its stone jar of water and a crust of bread and no one could go from cell to cell and there were screams and curses and yells of suffering and nobody heard them, for the walls were thick and darkness was everywhere. Why were there so many cells in the world?" (p. 361). Joining independent clauses with *and*'s, and omitting the grammatically necessary commas, Wright deploys in the passage the polysyndeton that he without fail uses to write dream sequences in his texts.[13] It is the failure of *koinon*—the confinement of each person in his prison cell—that makes modern life a dreamworld of unshareable existence.

Without a social link binding him to others, Bigger, in his dreamy solitude, becomes susceptible to the seductions of fascism, its promise, as the term's etymology suggests, of bound togetherness. The movements of predatory nationalism he reads about in newspapers seem to offer the solution to the "riddle" that has relentlessly "tantalized" him (*Native*, p. 17). Yearning to "band himself" with others, but unable to find "a common binding and a common life" amidst Black people, he turns to news of totalitarian depredations from Germany, Italy, and Japan: "He felt that some day there would be a black man who would whip the black people into a tight band and together they would act and end fear and shame" (pp. 114, 115). Calling the work of *koinon* "binding", Wright echoes Freud, for whom sustainable life requires the mechanism of *Bindung* on which Eros operates.[14] The individual's chronic unboundness in diasporic modernity—in Freud's terms, his fatal attachment to Thanatos—renders him susceptible to the seductions of totalitarianism, the luring call of fascism to which Bigger eagerly responds.

Idios/Koinon: Jacques Lacan

Like Wright's and Baldwin's, Jacques Lacan's invocation of *koinon*, in *Seminar VII*, is in large part a response to the specter of fascism. Lacan was not the first to discern in Sophocles's tragedy a suitable allegory of the catastrophe in 1930s Europe. If Jean Anouilh's *Antigone* (1944) has seemed to some commentators, including Lacan, to make a fascist out of its heroine,[15] it is because of her disregard of all common good beyond her duty to blood. When Creon (who, in Anouilh's adaptation, is much more conciliatory than in Sophocles' original [Fleming, p. 177]) asks for whom she commits her crime, she answers: "For nobody. For myself" (Anouilh, p. 33). That which once rendered her a thoroughly ambivalent character for the scripts of the Resistance—her haughty refusal of all compromise, all futurity, all politics—has made of her an ethical figure *par excellence* for contemporary Lacanians.[16] She is often spoken of as risking "subjective destitution", the kind of withdrawal from the symbolic field in which Lacanians have seen the possibility of radical politics.

The entire drama of *Antigone* revolves around competing claims of the common. Despite the heroine's radical isolation, her "solitude relative to others" (Lacan, *Sem. VII*, p. 272), the play begins with her appeal to *koinon*. Speaking to her sister, Ismene, she wonders about the evil that will befall them because of their cursed lineage:

> Ὦ κοινὸν αὐτάδελφον Ἰσμήνης κάρα,
>
> ἆρ' οἶσθ' ὅτι Ζεὺς τῶν ἀπ' Οἰδίπου κακῶν—
>
> ἆ,ποῖον οὐχὶ νῷν ἔτι ζώσαιν τελεῖ (p. 4)
>
> My own sister Ismene, linked to myself, are you aware that Zeus … ah, which of the evils that come from Oedipus is he not accomplishing while we still live? (p. 5, ellipsis in original)

The theme of *koinon* is emphasized by the odd redundancy, often noted by scholars and agonized over by translators, of the two words that follow the opening vocative: κοινὸν αὐτάδελφον. Addressing her sister not only with *koinon* but also with *autadelphos*, Antigone points to the intimate kinship they share through their dead mother's womb. She calls her sister, literally, "the common same-wombed one", indicating the "strange commonness" or "excessive sameness" that marks Oedipus's incestuous family line (P. A. Miller, pp. 87, 88)—an uncanny *koinon* whose ethical call overrides for Antigone the shared good of the *polis*.

As stand-ins for the *oikos* and the *polis*, Antigone and Creon guarantee the tragedy's unfolding in their inability to find common ground: his inflexibility in demanding that the traitorous Polynices be left unburied matches her stubborn insistence on treating her brother's body with the care one reserves for human remains. The juxtaposition of his appeal to *to koinon agathon* and hers to shared flesh has led commentators, most notably Hegel, to position the two characters on diametrically opposing sides, whose synthesis leads to a satisfactory ethical solution. For Hegel, Antigone and Creon represent the conflict between the city and the home, the pub-

lic and the private, the male and the female. He argues that both characters remain ethically wanting insofar as their claims cannot accommodate those of the opposing side, thereby rendering *Sittlichkeit* impossible. While Lacan, too, observes that Creon "exists to promote the good of all" (*Sem. VII*, p. 258), his reading departs from Hegel's in that, without any attempt at a conciliatory gesture of accommodation between the two parties, it unequivocally focuses on Antigone's desire, rendering Creon a minor figure in the drama. Indeed, with his focus on her relationship to Polynices (rather than her conflict with Creon), Lacan seems to insist on a stage in the dialectic from which Hegel, in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, has us move on. Hegel, too, finds the singular attachment between Antigone and Polynices important, yet for him it provides merely a prelude for a stage in the spirit's journey that will be left behind as one moves toward the ethical community.

In his reading, Lacan is particularly drawn to a moment that a number of nineteenth-century commentators, most famously Goethe, found incongruous enough to wager that the lines in question will be proven supposititious.[17] The moment that "carries with it the suggestion of a scandal" (*Sem. VII*, p. 256) is one where Antigone locates Polynices' importance, for which she will go to her grave, in his unrepeatable singularity. She justifies her commitment to him on the grounds that, since he is her only brother from deceased parents, there never will be another one like him; the connection is irreplaceable. It is this idiosyncrasy that stipulates Antigone's choice of the familial link, with a crazed passion not unlike Ajax's, over the common good of the *polis*. As against Creon's insistence that the traitor's body not be buried but be left to the scavenging dogs and birds, Antigone "affirms the unique value of [Polynices'] being without reference to any content, to whatever good or evil Polynices may have done or to whatever he may be subjected to" (*Sem. VII*, p. 279). She remains attached to him not because of his deeds or accomplishments, but because of an "essence" beyond any attributes that may have made him recognizable to the world. That which she shares with her brother is the unshareable.

For Lacan, there is no moving on from here to the more "mature" stage where Antigone's particularity would find its balance in the universality Creon represents and where the immediacy of the pagan world would expand into the breathing space of Christian modernity. Instead, what renders Antigone's passive resistance primary for Lacan is its grounding in the simultaneity of her appeal to *koinon* and that which is strictly singular, unshareable—the quality of *idios* in her relation to Polynices. In her unyieldingness, she figures the nonadaptive singularity that, as Cecilia Sjöholm writes, forms the core of Lacanian ethics: "from a Lacanian perspective, ethics can never be thought according to a social structure of normativity: the ethical moment refers to an impossibility, the kernel of a hard resistance that refuses to dissolve in *any* social or ethical order" (p. 134). As we can gauge from his unrelenting critique of postwar ego psychology, Baldwin similarly prioritizes in his ethics the nonadaptive and the untimely.

The eradication of all *koinon* in diasporic modernity renders Bigger vulnerable to totalitarianism, the kind of "fascination" with "charismatic" leadership that Gus-

tave Le Bon and Freud diagnosed in group dynamics.[18] Fascism fascinates because—as Hannah Arendt, too, will propose—the modern subject is lonely, radically isolated, without any model on which to imagine *to koinon agathon*.[19] With Bigger as his case study, Wright asks: Is it too late to think being-together otherwise than in terms of the fascistic bond? Is there a way to negotiate the unbinding force of modernity without turning one's unraveling into murderousness? Baldwin and Lacan respond that, to stall the colonization of *to koinon agathon* by the fascist imaginary, modern onto-ethics must trouble common ideals with that which remains strictly inassimilable to projects of togetherness, of collective *Bindung*, as they have been conceptualized so far.

Notwithstanding all divergences, incompatibilities, and indifference, Lacan's and Baldwin's ethical projects, as a constellation, thus meet at this specific point. Both constitute efforts to reconfigure *to koinon agathon*, the potential for shared lives, in the stark light of what the events of the 1930s and 40s had revealed of modernity's constitutive terrors. Equally critical of the notion of the fully adaptive subject promoted by ego psychology,[20] Baldwin and Lacan suggest that the *koinon* of a common world must be thought in conjunction with singularity, with an unshareable *idios*. Echoing Wright, Baldwin suggests that Western modernity, which must always be understood as diasporic modernity, constitutes an awakening where one dream (the premodern) was supplanted by another (bad faith). It is only by reinventing modernity's promise of singularity that the dream can be dispelled. For both Lacan and Baldwin, this *idios* is lived in the human subject's proximity to what Sophocles calls οὐδὲν: nothingness.

Nothing

That what Lacan calls "the absolute individual" (*Sem. VII*, p. 278) emerges in proximity to death—the common unshareable—is suggested by his reading of *Antigone*'s "ode to man", which Sophocles inserts between the messenger's news about the breach of Creon's commands and Antigone's subsequent arrest.[21] The chorus begins the hymn by extolling the creativity that informs all human endeavors, the persistence with which "man" triumphs in life. Yet, in a moment that Lacan finds crucial to the whole drama, the celebration is interrupted by a passing note that identifies in death the limit of human ingenuity:

> παντοπόρος· ἄπορος ἐπ' οὐδὲν ἔρχεται
>
> τὸ μέλλον· Ἅιδα μόνον
>
> φεῦξιν οὐκ ἐπάξεται·
>
> νόσων δ' ἀμηχάνων φυγὰς
>
> [Man] meets nothing in the future without resource; only from Hades shall he apply no means of flight; and he has contrived escape from desperate maladies. (Sophocles, p. 37)

Translators, including Hugh Lloyd-Jones, have heard in the chorus's commentary a celebration of the human ability to resourcefully tackle everything that the future might bring—everything, that is, except death. Lacan irritably notes that this observation sounds "a little too petty bourgeois" for someone of Sophocles' penetrating insight to make (*Sem. VII*, p. 275). He asks that, instead of indulging such inanities, we paraphrase the lines as follows: man "advances toward nothing that is likely to happen, he advances and he is παντοπόρος, 'artful,' but he is ἄπορος, always 'screwed'" (p. 275). The human subject craftily negotiates various dire straits, but it is in sailing toward the inescapable "nothing" (οὐδὲν) that he finds himself, unavoidably, ἄπορος, a term that Lacan connects to "aporia" or, a little less elegantly, to one's being "'screwed' [*couillonné*]" (p.275 / p. 321). (Dennis Porter's translation observes a decorous distance from the term by enveloping it in quotation marks, which do not appear in the French original.) If our being is marked by the way in which we are all, ultimately, fucked, Lacan suggests that translators have consistently missed—perhaps, repressed—the true significance of the subsequent lines by misreading the prepositions Sophocles uses. He argues that, rather than an "escape from" illness, the Greek νόσων δ' ἀμηχάνων φυγὰς must be translated as man's "'escape *into* impossible sicknesses'" (p. 275). The human subject is without recourse when faced with the netherworld (Ἅιδης); this intractable limit precipitates what Freud, some two and a half millennia after Sophocles, will call "flight into illness" ("Fragment", p. 75n). If we have assumed that Freud pathologizes the neurotic's dodging of reality, Lacan proposes that such sparring with—not "reality" but—the real is in fact, in its "artfulness", an ethical condition. "[Man] hasn't managed to come to terms with death", Lacan says, "but he invents marvelous gimmicks in the form of sicknesses he himself fabricates" (p. 275). This self-debilitation as an avoidance of dealing with nothingness constitutes "one of mankind's essential dimensions" (p. 275).

In Lacan's retranslation, the passage's implications for psychoanalytic ethics are clear. Our being *is* the symptom that emerges in the proximity of nothingness. Freud calls this "the painful riddle of death" (*Future*, p. 195), which religion, undoubtedly one of humankind's "marvelous gimmicks", comes to address. If this, ultimately, is the "riddle" that haunts Bigger Thomas, fascism tempts him like the "impossible sickness" that Lacan finds delineated in *Antigone*. Promising eternal life in *Völkischkeit*, fascism binds the solitary subject into the "tight band" that Bigger envisions as the way out of diasporic modernity's alienation (*Native*, p. 115). James Penney writes: "Only by recognizing the inviolable limit signified by death, Lacan contends, may the subject avoid the temptation of such an erroneous, fleshed-out universalism, one which causes him to do evil in the name of the Good" (p. 167). The universalism in question is Creon's. For Lacan, Creon's demand for an unequivocally shared *koinon* constitutes but an effort to escape desire's singularity and, as such, the nothing (οὐδὲν) that is the unshareable common of human existence; it is Creon, rather than Antigone, who is the fascist of the play, Lacan proposes.

Like Freud and Wright, Baldwin assigns the work of "binding" to the human subject circling around a nothing.[22] It is this operation that, as he writes in the early essay "Everybody's Protest Novel" (1949), keeps us from the yawning abyss in our being:

> Society is held together by our need; we bind it together with legend, myth, coercion, fearing that without it we will be hurled into that void, within which, lie the earth before the Word was spoken, the foundations of society are hidden. From this void—ourselves—it is the function of society to protect us; but it is only this void, our unknown selves, demanding, forever, a new act of creation, which can save us—"from the evil that is in the world." With the same motion, at the same time, it is this toward which we endlessly struggle and from which, endlessly, we struggle to escape. (pp. 16-17)

Protest novels, such as *Uncle Tom's Cabin* and (as Baldwin provocatively suggests) *Native Son*, may assign us a secure place in the common world, yet they do so at the cost of bolstering the Manichean structures whose symptoms they are meant to address. They save us from the void yet also annihilate *real* life. Merely reversing the assumptions propping the tragic scripts that momentarily seize control of the young Baldwin in New Jersey, they do not provide antidotes to the loneliness that renders the modern subject vulnerable to fascism. Rather, they leave us in the grip of the nightmare, in thrall of such imaginary constructions as what Baldwin, writing only a few years after the end of WWII, calls "*Herrenvolk*" ("Everybody's", p. 18). That in this process we, like Bigger, are bound to (become) fascists is similarly indicated by the unidentified quotation Baldwin inserts into the passage. The line "the evil that is in the world" comes from Albert Camus's *The Plague* (1947), the narrative about an Algerian town infected by *la peste*, in which readers had immediately discerned an allegory about the pestiferousness of totalitarianism (*la peste brune*, named after the brown shirts of the *Sturmabteilung*).[23]

For Lacan, the unshareability of being can be unfolded either in the masculine or the feminine mode. The *idios* of masculine desire is lived, for example, in the intricate choreographies of diasporic modernity's tragicomedies that Wright illustrates. Here any experience of *koinon* consists of the subject's sparring with his fascinating doppelgängers. It may also happen that the idiot finds willing accomplices who, donning the masks of his semblants, help sustain the dream of desirous complementarity. Luce Irigaray calls this kind of participation by women in the phallogocentric economy "mimicry" (*le mimétisme*) (p. 220). The African American tradition, too, has a term for such choreographed encounters where one subject has the capacity to compel the other to take on the roles scripted by the hegemonic order of desire: here, it is called "acting."[24] In acting, the double-conscious subject plays up to the other's desire, most often for the purposes of survival, but sometimes also for the pleasures of tricksterism. While acting can be used for possibly emancipatory ends (as Charles Chesnutt's "The Passing of Grandison" [1899] shows), for Wright and Baldwin such modes of survival merely feed the terrors of Western modernity.

"Acting" bequeaths the players a strange immortality as the protesting mind commits itself to "a deadly, timeless battle" (Baldwin, "Everybody's", p. 18). Like the Lacanian infant, riveted to his semblant, the younger Baldwin finds himself momentarily frozen in front of the mirror in the New Jersey diner. Lacan nevertheless implies that it is possible to relinquish the imaginary enthrallment that, in his terminology, feeds masculine jouissance. One might even speak of a *choice*: "one is not obliged, when one is male, to situate oneself on the side of $\forall\chi \quad \Phi\chi$ [that is, the masculine side]. One can also situate oneself on the side of the not-whole" (*Sem. XX*, p. 76). *Other* enjoyments can be cultivated by tilting the subject toward the void.

Twentieth-century philosophy, and most famously existentialism, has tended to identify this void-nothing with finitude. So, it seems, does psychoanalysis. In his exposition on the Lacanian real, Charles Shepherdson writes: "Death … involves a peculiar link between the symbolic and the real, presenting us with a sort of hole or void in the structure of meaning—a void that is not a deficiency, but virtually the opposite, an absolute condition of meaning" (*Lacan*, p. 3). Yet, as a reader of Shepherdson's insight would know, sex always supplements death in psychoanalysis: the presumed proximity of Lacan and Heidegger is modified when we note, with Joan Copjec and Alenka Zupančič, that in psychoanalytic thought the subject's *being-toward-death* is rewritten in the form of her *being-toward-sex*.[25] The void-nothing *sexuates the subject*. As Copjec has repeatedly reminded us,[26] "sex(uation)" cannot be reduced to what much of feminist theory calls "gender(ing)"; psychoanalytic thought refuses to disambiguate "sex." This is the point of Lacan's seemingly gratuitous vulgarity in his *Antigone* commentary: in the proximity of οὐδὲν the subject is, and has always been, *couillonné*. It bears repeating: each of us is fucked. In this precise sense, sex and death is all Lacan ever speaks about, and he names them in the same breath. Only masculine jouissance can pretend to escape such mortal bottoming.

As Copjec explains, at stake in Lacan's supplementation of finitude with sex is a reconfiguration of the concept of "the common":

> If sexuality is a phenomenon of the subject's displacement, its failure to coincide with itself, and this swerve is essential to the very definition of the subject, we could say that it is common to all subjects, without exception.… Perhaps the most significant agenda behind Lacan's gently mocking phrase [of "being-toward-sex"] is the forging of a new understanding of the common, one that in preserving the asymmetry of the different ways it is approached preserves the common itself, that is, preserves it full stop. ("Sexual Difference", p. 204, p. 206)

Two modes of being-toward-nothing, and consequently two modes of the common, present themselves. Whereas *Native Son* describes the operations of the masculine-sexuated dreamworld that Bigger thinks he can manipulate by playing (like) an

idiot, it is in the *idios kosmos* of the not-all, figured in Antigone, that resides the potential that Lacan calls "the absolute individual."

Lacan and Baldwin indicate that, if the subject is *symptomized into existence*, we let the symptom become chronic at our peril. Lacan suggests this with his famously ambiguous stipulation that one neither *give up on* nor *give into* his desire (*cédé sur son désir*) (*Sem. VII*, p. 319 / p. 368). In the speculative onto-ethics that he begins to delineate in "Everybody's Protest Novel", Baldwin offers us a similarly double demand. He suggests that, by approaching and escaping from the void, we court "something resolutely indefinable, unpredictable"; undoing the ossified forms that root totalitarianism, "we can find at once ourselves and the power that will free us from ourselves" ("Everybody's", p. 13). Lacan and Baldwin suggest that, with some effort, one may be able to sustain, for a little while longer, the minimal opening that shakes Bigger after Mary's death, without having it immediately close, in the "temporal pulsation" (*Sem. XI*, p. 143) typical of the unconscious. It is possible to cultivate what Sophocles calls Antigone's "self-willed passion" (p. 85) as a potential access to the *real* life whose alarm bells repeatedly jolt us out of our atemporal dreamworlds.

Notes

1. Ben Tyrer, too, links Lacan's terminology in *Seminar XX* to Heraclitus, p.138.

2. On the concept of the semblant, which I will leave unexplored here, see DeGabriele, Herron, and Peláez, eds.

3. "Fascism" and "binding" are etymologically related: the early Italian fascists, and then Mussolini, adopted from ancient Rome the symbol of *fasces*/*fascio*, comprised of a "[b]undle of rods or sticks, bound together with an ax", to signal their strength-in-unity (de Grand). See also Weingart, pp. 19-20.

4. The most detailed account of the logic can be found in Chiesa esp. ch. 4.

5. For succinct mappings of this turn, see Dean p. 36ff.; and Mellard.

6. For an early, and in its clarity still useful, account of the real, see Shepherdson, "Intimate"; and the essay's revized version in Shepherdson, *Lacan*, pp. 1-49. On *extimité*, see also J.-A. Miller; and Guéguen, pp. 269-71.

7. On this dynamic, see also Lacan, *Seminar II*, pp. 180-81.

8. See Lacan's utilization of Caillois's work in "Mirror", p. 77 and *Seminar XI*, pp. 73-74, pp. 99-100. On "paranoid knowledge" in *Native Son*, see also Tuhkanen, "Grimace."

9. Baldwin evokes this term: *Fire*, p. 325.

10. The following borrows from my earlier discussion of the scene from "Notes of a Native Son": Tuhkanen, "Losing."

11. The dialogue is reprinted in Baldwin, *Conversations*, pp. 83-92.

12. Apart from JanMohamed, Merrill Cole, in "Nat Turner's Thing", reads examples of African American writing in the context of Patterson's and Lacan's theories of social death.

13. For passages in Wright where dreams are narrated in polysyndetons, see *Native*, pp. 126-27, pp. 165-66; *Man Who Lived*, pp. 79-80; *Savage*, pp. 170-71; *Long*, pp. 25, 75, 144-45, 253-54. Wright echoes Freud, who argues in *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900) that "dream-work" does away with the contrastive conjunctions that organize our waking thought. Thus, whenever the analysand articulates her dream-thoughts in terms of such logic, the analyst should "treat the two apparent alternatives as of equal validity and link them together with an 'and'" (pp. 422, 427, 428).

14. For discussion of *Ent/bindung* in Freud, see Borch-Jacobsen, *Freudian*, pp. 127-239 and "Primal"; Laplanche and Pontalis, pp. 50-52; and Livingstone Smith.

15. See Lacan, *Seminar VII*, p. 250. For an account of the multivalent reception, and an argument for the ultimately fascist resonances, of Anouilh's adaptation, see Fleming.

16. Of the numerous commentaries on Lacan's reading of *Antigone*, I have found the most illuminating Joan Copjec's (*Imagine*, ch. 1), James Penney's (ch. 5), and Marc De Kesel's (ch. 8).

17. On the debate between Hegel, Goethe, and others on the lines' possible spuriousness, see Leonard pp. 141-42; and Douzinas pp. 1352-54.

18. See Le Bon, pp. 31, 130-36; Freud, *Group*, pp. 102, 108, 133. On "charisma", see Weber, p. 374ff. On charisma and fascism, see Costa, Eatwell, and Larsen; and Kallis. On charisma's role as a constituent of "fascination", see Baumbach, pp. 33-34, 57-59, 103-04.

19. See Arendt; and Gaffney, chs. 3-5.

20. On Lacan and ego psychology, see Zeitlin. On Baldwin and ego psychology, see Tuhkanen, "Baldwin."

21. See Sophocles, pp. 35-37; and Lacan, *Seminar VII*, pp. 274-76. For a skillful commentary on Lacan's interpretation of the ode, see Penney, pp. 165-67.

22. I have elsewhere, and with different emphases, explored the shared idiom of "binding" in Freud and Baldwin: Tuhkanen, "Binding."

23. Baldwin's quotation comes from the opening of chapter 8 of Stuart Gilbert's translation: "The evil that is in the world always comes of ignorance, and good intentions may do as much harm as malevolence, if they lack understanding" (Camus, p. 110). For a recent assessment of the intertwined themes of colonialism and fascism in Camus's novel, see Raza Kolb ch. 4. As she writes, "*The Plague* … speaks not only to what happened in the Second World War, but also to the epidemics of colonialism, which … begin to reveal themselves as continuous with the pathological nationalism of the Third Reich" (p. 168).

24. Wright finds the same dynamics played out in the colonial world, too: see "Psychological", pp. 17-20.

25. See Copjec's discussion of Lacan's modified Heideggerianism in "Sexual Difference", pp. 205- 6. Copjec engages Zupančič's commentary on Lacan's neologism, pp. 20, 55.

26. See Copjec, *Read*, ch. 8; "Fable"; "Sexual Compact"; and (overlapping with the previous) "Sexual Difference."

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